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1 Introduction
Profitable investment by a pioneering firm often breeds imitation by subsequent entrants. When
developing an invention into a commercial product requires significant enough resources so that
only a few firms may jockey to secure positions in an industry either as a first-mover or as
a second entrant, product development takes the form of a noncooperative timing game. The
central contribution of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework for strategic investment
that integrates key features from existing research on innovation and the dynamics of firm entry
in order to produce a useful and general formalization of first and second-mover advantage, and
the consequences of the resulting investment incentives for industry dynamics.
The ease of imitation by a second entrant, as reflected by its irreversible cost of investment
relative to that of the first mover, plays a central role in this framework. This central role in
the theory is consistent with practice, as the ease of imitation depends on natural entry barriers
but is also determined by the firms and regulators, through their choices of technology, licensing,
and intellectual property protection levels.1 Depending on whether imitation cost is high or low,
the industry is characterized by a potential first- or second-mover advantage, and the strategic
interaction between firms takes the form of a preemption race or of a war of attrition.
1.1 Results
The central proposition in this paper is the characterization of equilibrium for a class of games
that ranges from attrition to preemption, from which we are able to derive a number of other
results, in particular with respect to welfare.
First, as firms are taken to be ex-ante identical and their roles as innovator or imitator are
endogenous, positional rents are dissipated. As one might expect, a higher imitation cost turns
out to be associated with accelerated product introduction and a larger expected lead time for
the innovating firm before the second entry occurs. We are therefore able to identify an optimal
level of imitation cost for firms: industry value is maximized, all else equal, in those industries in
which the cost of imitation is such that there is neither a race to preempt nor a war of attrition,
i.e. in which firms do not compete for positional rents by rushing to enter or waiting unduly to
innovate. The intuition behind this result runs as follows. When the imitation cost increases,
a follower firm delays entry and has a lower expected value, so that a leader firm can expect to
1Mansfield et al. [27] and Mansfield [26] are pioneering empirical studies that have fixed the perception of
imitation upon which much subsequent theoretical work is based. See also Cohen et al. [8].
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benefit from a longer monopoly phase, and therefore has a higher expected value ex ante. When
firms engage in a preemption race, rent equalization pegs expected value to the follower value,
and thus decreases with imitation cost. Conversely, in a war of attrition, the expected value of
firms is that of the leader firm, which increases with imitation cost.
In addition to an optimal level of imitation cost for the industry, we identify the welfare
trade-offs associated with raising imitation cost, as may arise with broader patent protection, for
instance. We identify a positive lower bound for the optimal level of imitation cost, which must
be sufficiently large so that firm entry into the industry is sequential, rather than simultaneous,
with positive probability. Moreover, as raising the imitation cost above this lower bound both
increases expected industry value and accelerates initial product development, broader patent
protection results in a greater social surplus so long as the increased lag in imitation does not
have too great an impact on consumer surplus. Socially optimal outcomes are thus more likely
to involve a preemption regime than one of attrition under these circumstances, and it can be
optimal to rule out imitator entry by means of a prohibitively high level of imitation cost.
Finally, we enlarge the set of alternatives that are available to firms to allow for the possibility
that the innovator raises entry barriers by making its product more complex and hence difficult
to reengineer, as well as contracting options like “pay for delay” and licensing agreements. In all
of these cases, the expected value of innovating firms is shifted upward, so strategic interaction
in the industry becomes more preemptive, and there are contrasting implications regarding firm
values and the timing of the imitator’s entry.
Thus, in a model of the effect of imitation cost on entry behavior, we provide conditions under
which a social optimum involves preemption, and argue that several alternative mechanisms exist
that can substitute for regulatory measures in providing for dynamic efficiency.
1.2 An example: imitation cost in the biopharmaceutical industry
The questions we address were originally motivated by real-world situations in which the same
firms can face contrasting technological conditions with respect to ease of imitation over the
different business segments in which they operate. In the biopharmaceutical industry, typically,
whereas medications are easily imitated thus justifying the industry’s systematic recourse to
patent protection, in the vaccine segment technological conditions render imitation much more
costly.2
2Another characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is the uncertainty that is introduced by late-stage clinical
trials regarding the outcome of an R&D project, most often after significant costs have already been sunk, but we
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On the one hand, pharmaceutical firms typically rely on intellectual property rights in order
to increase the costs of imitators for new drugs “which otherwise could be copied more easily
than products whose production processes can be kept secret, or for which the time and relative
expense needed to copy the invention are much higher” (Scherer and Watal [33], p. 4). If such
patent protection is not available, a generic product can be introduced at a much lower fixed cost
than incurred by the branded product supplier. In India, after the passage of the Patents Act
1970, and before the TRIPs (Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights) agreements
were enforced, pharmaceutical products became unpatentable, “allowing innovations patented
elsewhere to be freely copied” (Lanjouw [24], p. 3). By reducing imitation costs, the absence of
legal protection fostered the domestic production of generic formulations.
This ease of imitation is not found in the vaccine segment, as vaccines are made from living
micro-organisms, and unlike drugs “are not easily reverse-engineered, as the greatest challenges
often lie in details of production processes that cannot be inferred from the final product,” im-
plying that “there is technically no such thing as a generic vaccine” (Wilson [37], p. 13). The
regulatory implication is that a me-too vaccine supplier must pay for clinical trials to demonstrate
the safety and efficacy of its product. There is no short-cut toward the bio-equivalence of a copied
candidate vaccine, whose design and delivery require investments in technological capabilities and
manufacturing facilities that comply with demanding regulatory standards. In the case of recent
complex vaccines (e.g., a tetravalent dengue virus vaccine), a follower must catch up with leading-
edge R&D and manufacturing approaches (the technological challenges for the design a dengue
virus vaccine are reviewed in Guey Chuen et al. [17]). The fixed cost that must be incurred by a
new entrant for the delivery of a follow-on vaccine can thus be prohibitively high.3
1.3 Related literature
Our model of innovation and imitation builds upon an already rich literature dating back to Rein-
ganum [31], who provides a foundation for dynamic game-theoretic models of duopoly investment
that she construes as technology adoption. In a deterministic environment in which one of the
firms can commit as a first investor, she identifies a diffusion equilibrium in which investments
occur sequentially and result in a first-mover advantage. Fudenberg and Tirole [13] consider in-
vestment decisions when leader and follower roles are endogenous. With symmetric firms, there
is a preemption race that accelerates the first investment, dissipating rents to the first investor so
do not seek to represent this specific feature in our model.
3We further discuss this example in light of the theoretical model in Section 4.1.
4
that firm values are equalized in equilibrium. In an otherwise similar framework but with asym-
metric firms, Katz and Shapiro [23] allow either licensing or imitation to occur post-investment.
They find that a second-mover advantage can arise, so that investment decisions take the form
either of a preemption race or of a waiting game.
Some recent research on innovation dynamics has focused on informational spillovers, which
are one of the important determinants of second-mover advantage, into models of duopoly invest-
ment. A key reference is Hoppe [20] which introduces uncertainty regarding the success of new
technology adoption. The follower firm only invests if the new technology is profitable, so that
when the likelihood of success is low, firms engage in a war of attrition. In a similar vein, Huisman
and Kort [22] allow the follower to benefit from the subsequent arrival of a better technology, and
Femminis and Martini [12] model a disclosure lag of random duration before the follower benefits
from a spillover. The effect of informational spillovers on investment incentives has also been
studied in models of learning by De´camps and Mariotti [9] and Thijssen et al. [35]. In these mod-
els, the first-mover’s investment sends a profitability signal to the follower in addition to some
ongoing background information that both firms receive. Depending on the relative importance
of the preemption motive and the informational externality, firms engage in either preemption or
attrition.
Through these different contributions runs a common thread, namely that to the extent an
innovator’s investment has positive spillovers for its rival, competition between otherwise sym-
metric firms takes the form either of a preemption race or of a war of attrition. We depart from
prior work by deriving a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in a model of strategic investment
that incorporates both potential first- and second-mover advantages, sparsely parametrized by the
relative sunk costs of innovating and imitating firms. Thus, our paper integrates the characteri-
zations of attrition by Hendricks et al. [18] and preemption in a stochastic setting by Thijssen et
al. [36]. In so doing, we extend the so-called standard real option game framework4 by relaxing
the assumption that leader and follower investment costs are identical and exogenous. The most
closely related work that we have identified in this area are those of Pawlina and Kort [30] and
Mason and Weeds [28], which introduce firm asymmetry into duopoly investment games in ways
that are complementary to the approach we adopt here.
Several other strands of research provide broader context for our work. In particular, the ease
4Azevedo and Paxson [2] is a recent survey of this field, which draws from game theory and continuous time
finance in order to incorporate strategic and payoff uncertainty into models of investment. Typical applications
are to capacity investment, as in Boyer et al. [6], as well as investment in R&D, as in the present paper. For a
thorough and pedagogical presentation, see Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [7].
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of imitation is pertinent in determining optimum patents, as described by Gallini [15] from whom
we follow the formal specification of the cost of “inventing around”. The dynamics of patent races
can be studied with similar tools to the strategic investment research cited above, as in Weeds [38],
although such applications more closely describe the invention stage of innovation whereas our
focus is on the subsequent development or product introduction phase. Another stream of research
dating back to Benoit [3] studies imitation incentives once an innovator has achieved incumbency.
More recent papers such as Mukherjee and Pennings [29] and Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda [19] have
identified the importance of the patenting, licensing, and reverse engineering decisions that then
arise. Our analysis is also related to models of cumulative innovation, as exemplified by Green and
Scotchmer [16] and Denicolo` [10]. Lastly, the concepts of first and second mover advantage that
we approach here from an economic standpoint are of broad interest to managers and strategists,
and the survey of Lieberman and Montgomery [25] remains a useful reference in this area.
2 A model of new product development
This section describes a model of strategic investment in line with the characteristic features of
innovation and imitation that we have identified. The assumptions regarding industry structure
and firm conduct are presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, and equilibrium in Section 2.3.
2.1 Assumptions
Two otherwise identical firms may enter a new market by introducing their own version of a
product. Product development involves uncertainty regarding future levels of final demand and
irreversibility, as in the investment framework described by Dixit and Pindyck [11]. Organizational
constraints preclude a firm from selling two variants of the product.
The introduction of the product generates a perpetual profit flow whose instantaneous value
depends on the number of active firms: piM when a single firm is active, and piD when both are.
These flow profit levels may reflect either standard duopoly competition (0 < 2piD ≤ piM ) or
duopoly competition with significant complementary product differentiation (piM ≤ 2piD ≤ 2piM ).
Flow profit is scaled by a multiplicative shock (Yt) representing market size that follows a geometric
Brownian motion (dYt = αYtdt+σYtdZt where (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener process). Profit flows
are assumed to begin instantaneously and with certainty once investment has occurred.5 Firms
5Thus, we do not purport to model lead times, and our approach contrasts with some of the related work on
patent races or information spillovers cited above, in which the success of innovation is an additional stochastic
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have a common and constant discount rate (r).
Introducing the new product involves an irrecuperable fixed cost (I) for the the first firm
that invests, i.e. for the innovator. A firm that observes its rival’s innovation can invest after,
even immediately, as a second entrant, i.e. as an imitator. We assume that in addition to the
various standard setup costs associated with bringing a product to market such as dedicated
plant and equipment, marketing expenditures, and so forth, the follower incurs a cost of imitation
of variable magnitude depending on technological, institutional, or other industry conditions.
Introducing the alternative version thus involves an irrecuperable fixed cost (K), and we allow
for the extreme case of costless imitation. The imitator’s fixed cost may be either higher or
lower than the innovator’s, depending both on the difficulty of reengineering and on the degree
of protection afforded to the intellectual property of innovators. If the second firm can develop
the same product independently, for ex-ante identical firms, imitation is no more expensive than
innovation (K ≤ I) in the absence of intellectual property protection. When the complexity of
the product is limited or legal protection is weak (when the breadth of patents is narrow) the
imitation costs can still be low enough that the entry cost is lower for the follower than for the
leader. On the other hand, greater technological complexity and stronger legal protection imply a
higher cost for imitators who must invest in reverse engineering or invent around any patents held
by the innovator, although this is mitigated by disclosure requirements that reduce unnecessary
duplication of effort. Of course, in addition to natural barriers and technological impediments to
imitation, legal rules may translate into more or less successful protection of innovators, depending
on whether rights are transferred or not, whether there is a pool of rights involved or not, the
breadth of patents and so forth. Conceivably, the product can be so complex or legal protection
can be so strong as to make the second mover incur higher entry costs than the leader (K > I).6
Moreover, we later show that such a level of complexity legal protection can be socially optimal
(in fact, that it can even be efficient to rule out the second firm’s entry altogether by setting an
element for firms. A lower cost of imitation in our model is consistent with an informational spillover as well, if
innovation requires success on a large number of independent trials or a search process that an imitator can bypass.
6Our focus is the relation between innovation and imitation, but other circumstances can also lead to asymmetric
fixed costs for ex-ante identical firms. If developing the new product involves scarce assets, such as prime location
in real estate or natural resource extraction, then the imitator may face a higher cost (K > I). We do not pursue
this interpretation actively. One area where doing so would make a difference is in the case of “ties”, where we
will assume that if both firms seek to and effectively invest simultaneously, the investment cost is I, rather than
max {I,K} as would be the case if firms had to compete for scarce assets in the input market. Also, imperfect
competition in input markets may result in asymmetric investment costs. In Billette de Villemeur et al. [5],
investment cost is determined endogenously by a strategic input supplier, resulting in a discounted input price for
the first firm that invests (I < K).
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arbitrarily high imitation cost K∗ =∞).
Finally, we suppose that information is complete and that α ≥ 0, σ ≥ 0 (with one of these
inequalities strict), α < r, and 0 < Y0 < (r − α) I/piM ,7 so that absent competition an innovating
firm would initially prefer to delay investment and hold on to their growth option, either because
of deterministic growth in demand, or volatility, or some combination of the two.
2.2 Threshold strategies and leader and follower payoffs
Firms decide independently when to introduce a new product. In order to focus on the economic
aspects of the decision problems of the firms, we describe a reduced form market entry game that
captures the relevant features of a more general dynamic entry game. This is done by taking firm
strategies to consist of investment thresholds, which determine a stochastic time of investment,
and by imposing a specific tie-breaking rule in the event that both firms face a known coordination
problem in which they seek to invest simultaneously when it would only be optimal for one to do
so (see Section A.1 for a description of the underlying dynamic game). This representation of the
game gains in simplicity, and the equilibrium that is obtained is consistent with the equilibrium
of the general entry game.
At any time t ≥ 0 at which it has not yet invested, the strategy of a firm i, i ∈ {1, 2}
consists of an entry threshold Yi ∈ [Yt,∞) that, once reached for the first time and from below,
triggers investment. Threshold choices result in (stochastic) investment times and endogenously
determine the role of each firm as innovator or imitator. In the case of identical thresholds
(Yi = Yj), a tie-breaking rule that subsumes the equilibrium of the underlying continuous time
game randomly determines the roles of each firm. Under these conditions, industry dynamics in
the product market may be viewed as resulting from a two stage interaction, where in the first
stage (which determines the onset of the monopoly phase) the choices of initial entry thresholds
(Yi, Yj) determine the roles of the firms, and in the second stage (the onset of the duopoly phase),
the remaining firm enters at a threshold of its choice that we denote by Y e−i (with Y
e
−i ≥ Yi) for
the moment.
The expected payoffs for innovators and imitators have the following specific forms:
L
(
Yi, Y
e
−i
)
=
(
piM
r − αYi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
+
piD − piM
r − α Y
e
−i
(
Yt
Y e−i
)β
(innovator payoff) (1)
7This bound ensures that firms prefer to delay investment under preemption rather than invest immediately,
even when imitation costs are large.
8
and
F (Yi;K) =
(
piD
r − αYi −K
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
(imitator payoff) (2)
where in both (1) and (2), β is shorthand for the function of parameters
β (α, σ, r) :=
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
. (3)
The function β given in (3) is a standard expression in real option models, satisfying β > 1
and limσ→0 β = r/α. A lower value of β is associated with a greater incentive to wait (it is
straightforward to check that ∂β/∂α < 0, ∂β/∂σ < 0, and ∂β/∂r > 0), so β may be interpreted as
a measure of “impatience”. The (Yt/•)β terms in which β occurs reflect the expected discounting
of the monetary units that are received when the stochastic process reaches the relevant thresholds
{Yi, Yj} for the first time.8
The leader (innovator) payoff is comprised of two terms, which correspond to the monopoly
profit flow of the innovating firm and the negative impact on this profit flow of the second firm’s en-
try. The follower (imitator) payoff has the standard form of a growth option. Both payoff functions
are quasiconcave over their domains (note that F is log-concave), and attain non-negative global
maxima at YL := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ) and YF := max {Yt, (β (r − α)K) / ((β − 1)piD)}
respectively. We refer to these thresholds as the optimal standalone leader and follower thresh-
olds, and they correspond to the open loop equilibrium identified by Reinganum [31].9 A key
property of the payoff functions which is used throughout our analysis is that the leader pay-
off is nondecreasing in the imitation cost provided the follower invests at the optimal follower
threshold (∂L (Yi, YF ) /∂K ≥ 0), whereas the follower payoff is decreasing in the imitation cost
(∂F (Yi;K) /∂K < 0).
Lastly, both firms may introduce their respective products independently at the same moment,
in which case we assume that they incur the same fixed cost. The corresponding payoff is denoted
by M (Yi) := L (Yi, Yi) (= F (Yi; I)), which is maximized at YS := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD).
8In the deterministic case (σ = 0) and letting ti := inf {τ , Yτ ≥ Yi}, (Yt/Yi)β = exp(−r (ti − t)), which is the
standard continuous time discounting term under certainty.
9For sufficiently low values of K (K ∈ [0,Kl), Kl := (piD/piM )I), YF < YL. In this range, if roles were
exogenously assigned, a follower would be willing to pay its rival to induce it to invest earlier. We mention this
possibility for completeness, but the threshold Kl does not play a significant role in the rest of the analysis.
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2.3 Equilibrium
We choose to focus on symmetric equilibrium. One reason for this is that as firms are taken to
be symmetric ex-ante, it seems natural to suppose that they hold symmetric beliefs about each
other’s play at the beginning of the investment game. In so doing, the equilibrium described
in Proposition 1 below is consistent with the earlier approaches of Fudenberg and Tirole [13],
Hendricks et al. [18], and more recently, Thijssen et al. [36], but authors have occasionally
proceeded differently, particularly with respect to attrition equilibrium.10 Another reason to focus
on symmetric equilibrium is that it results in rent dissipation, a feature that is emphasized in the
early timing game literature as surveyed by Fudenberg and Tirole [14], and which rationalizes a
smooth dependence of equilibrium on imitation cost that is of compelling simplicity.
The reduced form game described in Section 2.2 occurs in two stages. First, firms compete in
entry thresholds that endogenously determine their roles as innovators or imitators, and second,
at once after initial entry has occurred, the remaining firm selects its own entry threshold. We
therefore have
• Stage 1: both firms select initial entry thresholds (Yi, Yj) (or distribution thereof) that
determine innovator and imitator roles;
• Stage 2: if a single firm (i) innovates, the remaining firm (j) then selects its imitator entry
threshold.
To determine the equilibrium choices, notice that once the initial investment by at least one of
the firms has occurred, any firm that remains out of the market holds a standard growth option. It
prefers to wait if the first investment occurs early enough (before YF is reached), and otherwise it
prefers to invest immediately. The optimal follower policy for a given first investment threshold Yi
is therefore Y ∗F = max {Yi, YF }, resulting in the follower value F (Y ∗F ;K). By backward induction,
the first stage leader payoff is therefore L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
In the first stage, a given firm i’s payoff is
V (Yi, Yj) =

L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) if Yi < Yj
p (Yi;K)L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) + p (Yi;K)F (Y
∗
F ;K) + (1− 2p (Yi;K))M (Yi) if Yi = Yj
F (Y ∗F ;K) if Yi > Yj
(4)
10A contrasting approach is that of Hoppe [20], who focuses attention on asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
in a war of attrition. This approach applies if, for instance, the same entry game is played in several independent
markets and pre-play communication allows the firms to coordinate, but we do not allow for this possibility here.
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where the second line of (4) reflects the tie-breaking rule of the reduced form game, which runs as
follows. If at a given moment both firms seek to invest, whereas it would only be optimal for one
to do so (i.e. if F (Y ∗F ;K) > M (Yi)), then they face a known coordination problem (Fudenberg
and Tirole [13]). If coordination is successful, either firm is equally likely to invest as a leader or
as a follower, with probability
p (Yi;K) =

F(Y ∗F ;K)−M(Yi)
L(Yi,Y ∗F )+F(Y
∗
F ;K)−2M(Yi)
if L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) ≥ F (Y ∗F ;K)
0 if L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < F (Y
∗
F ;K)
. (5)
The expression (1− 2p (Yi;K)) thus corresponds to the probability that a “mistaken” simultane-
ous investment outcome occurs.11
Note that there are two kinds of simultaneous investment outcomes that can arise in the model.
If one firm invests first and thereby takes the role of innovator, but does so at a sufficiently high
threshold (Yi ≥ YF ), the remaining firm then chooses to invest immediately after, although it
takes the follower role so its payoff is F (Yi;K). On the other hand, if both firms attempt to
invest simultaneously without coordinating their investments, they both receive the same payoff
M (Yi).
In the proposition that follows, we establish that there exists a critical imitation cost, which
we denote by K̂,12 that determines the nature of the duopoly investment game. This imitation
cost is defined implicitly by the condition that firms in equilibrium are indifferent between the
innovator and imitator payoffs when these are evaluated at the optimal standalone thresholds,
that is L (YL, Y
∗
F ) = F
(
Y ∗F ; K̂
)
(note that Y ∗F is a function of K). Provided that K ≥ K̂ so
that this is well-defined in [Yt,∞), it is also useful to define a critical level of the multiplicative
shock Yt, which we denote by YP , and which is usually referred to as the preemption point.
This is the first threshold at which firms are indifferent between innovating and imitating, i.e.
L (YP , Y
∗
F ) = F (Y
∗
F ;K). Then,
Proposition 1 The duopoly investment game has a unique symmetric equilibrium and there ex-
ists a threshold imitation cost K̂ ≤ I such that:
(i) if the imitation cost is low (K < K̂), firms play a game of attrition. The innovator investment
threshold (min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
) is bounded below by the standalone leader threshold (YL) and distributed
11A noteworthy contrast between our model and the standard real option game is that the values of the leader
and follower payoffs generally differ at YF because of the asymmetry in investment costs. For some values of K,
the behavior of the mistake probability 1− 2p (Yi;K) is non-monotonic (See Section A.1).
12See Section A.2 for a characterization of K̂ :=
(
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)β
)1/(β−1)
I.
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continuously over a possibly disconnected support, and imitator investment occurs either at the
optimal standalone follower threshold (YF ) or immediately after the innovator’s entry.
(ii) if the imitation cost is intermediate (K = K̂), firms invest at the optimal standalone leader
and follower thresholds (YL, YF ), with either firm equally likely to be the innovator or the imitator.
(iii) if the imitation cost is high (K > K̂), firms play a game of preemption. The innovator and
imitator investment thresholds are (YP , YF ), with either firm equally likely to be the innovator or
the imitator.
In order to illustrate the cases described in Proposition 1, Figures 1 − 5 depict leader and
follower payoffs in the first stage of the game, for different typical values of the imitation cost.
Throughout these figures, as the imitation cost increases, the follower payoff shifts down and
towards the right, and the optimal standalone follower threshold YF increases. Because of the
longer monopoly phase, the first stage leader payoff L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) accordingly shifts upward over
the sequential investment range (Y0, YF ). Note that the optimal standalone leader threshold
YL is independent of K, and the leader payoff function has a kink at YF when imitator entry
becomes immediate. In Figures 1 and 2, there is a second-mover advantage (in the sense that
L (YL, YF ) < F (YF ;K)) and the game is one of attrition. Figure 3 represents the intermediate
case in which the imitation cost attains its critical value, K = K̂, and there is neither a first-mover
advantage nor a second-mover advantage. In Figures 4 and 5, there is a first-mover advantage
(in the sense that L (YL, YF ) > F (YF ;K)), and the game is one of preemption, with the first
investment occurring at YP .
With respect to the expected values that firms attain in equilibrium, in the symmetric equi-
librium described in Proposition 1, rent dissipation occurs whenever the firms play a game of
attrition (K < K̂) or of preemption (K > K̂). To state the following corollary, some further no-
tation is necessary. Since L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) can have two local maxima, in some attrition cases in which
the imitation cost is sufficiently low such as that illustrated in Figure 1, the global maximum
of this function may be attained at YS := arg maxM (Yi), which then corresponds to the lower
bound of the support of innovator entry thresholds. Thus, define Y ∗L := arg maxL (Yi, Y
∗
F ), which
may be either YL or YS , to refer to the lower bound of all the threshold distributions in attrition
equilibrium.
Corollary 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected payoffs of firms are identical and equal to
min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)}, that is to the lowest of the diffusion equilibrium payoffs.
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The dependence of the threshold imitation cost K̂ on model parameters is straightforward to
characterize. The next corollary gives sensitivity results with respect to the intensity of competi-
tion in the product market (piM/piD) and discounting (β).
Corollary 2 The more intense product market competition is (high piM/piD) and the more firms
discount the future (high β), the more likely it is that preemption occurs, and conversely for
attrition.
To interpret this corollary, recall that the process Yt is stochastic, and there is an option
value for firms to wait before investing that is positively related to volatility. Provided that there
is an inherent advantage to imitation (K < I), for some levels of the parameters this option
value can outweigh any preemption motive to secure monopoly rents. Thus, as ∂β/∂σ < 0, by
Corollary 2 an attrition regime is more likely in industries with greater demand volatility. This
comparative static effect is of particular importance because it stands in opposition to several of
the mechanisms that are discussed in the rest of the paper. As the next sections show, institutional
conditions such as intellectual property protection and firm choices regarding both technology and
licensing generally serve to make market entry regimes more preemptive and attrition relatively
rare, absent significant demand uncertainty.
3 Normative economics of imitation cost
The main result of the previous section highlights the key role that is played by the sunk cost of
imitation in determining the nature of strategic competition and the properties of market entry
in equilibrium. This imitation cost is likely to be determined by several different factors including
technological development and the level of intellectual property protection. It thus varies from
industry to industry, and can be influenced ex-ante, most commonly upward, by regulators. Such
considerations raise the question of determining what may be desirable levels of imitation cost.
At first glance, a higher imitation cost is socially wasteful in and of itself but also serves to hasten
innovator entry, however different effects arise in the preemption and attrition regimes that need
to be examined carefully.
In fact, it turns out that social welfare is not a quasiconcave function of imitation cost and
therefore generally has local maxima in the attrition and preemption regimes.13 Nevertheless, we
13Thus, models that focus attention exclusively on either attrition (second-mover advantage) or preemption
(first-mover advantage) run the risk of identifying only local maxima of welfare.
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are able to provide a partial characterization of the social optimum, as well as the underlying
welfare trade-offs associated with raising imitation cost. As a preliminary step to conducting this
more thorough welfare analysis we first consider industry performance only, which allows us to
derive a useful intermediate result regarding industry value.
3.1 Industry performance
Understanding the determinants of first and second-mover advantages is a question of long-running
interest to scholars of industry dynamics, both in economics and in strategic management, even
if the research agendas of the two disciplines differ (strategic management focuses on asymmetric
and heterogeneous firms). In the terminology of Lieberman and Montgomery [25], the framework
we have developed sheds light on the role of technological leadership and free-riding incentives
(and to a lesser extent, on the preemption of scarce assets, see footnote 5 above) insofar as these
are accurately represented by variations in imitation cost. The effect of changes in imitation cost
on equilibrium choices and profit can then be described as follows.
A first and seemingly obvious consideration that emerges from our framework is that lower
imitation cost is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for second mover advantage. Since K̂ ≤
I, if firms have identical fixed costs, there is an inherent first-mover advantage that results from
the monopoly phase of the game (L (YL, Y
∗
F ) ≥ F (Y ∗F ; I)). The degree of first-mover advantage
in this case is determined by the relative importance of monopoly profit in the product market
(piM/piD). A second-mover advantage arises because of conditions on inputs, and requires that the
relative advantage of imitation (I/K) be sufficient to compensate for foregone monopoly profit.
Thus the empirical presence of lower costs for imitators, as has been observed by different authors
(Mansfield et al. [27], Samuelson and Scotchmer [32]), does not by itself ensure that firms will
find it desirable to pursue so-called imitation strategies in a dynamic setting.
As imitation always occurs at some point (provided duopoly profits are positive) a key ques-
tion regarding firm investment decisions in our model is not whether imitation will occur, but
rather when, and what consequences imitator entry may have for the incentive to innovate. To
begin, note that the higher is the imitation cost, the higher is the standalone threshold for the
follower firm (YF ), although actual follower entry may occur either at this threshold or later if
the investment game is one of attrition. The effect of higher imitation cost on the first firm’s
entry threshold is indirect. In the attrition regime, it is the distribution of innovator entry thresh-
olds (of min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
) and therefore entry times that is shifted forward by higher imitation costs,
with a higher value of K hastening innovator entry in a stochastic sense (the hazard rate of en-
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try increases). In the preemption regime, rent equalization results directly in a lower preemption
threshold (YP ) when imitation cost increases. The link between imitation cost and earlier product
introduction is thus similar to that identified by Katz and Shapiro [23]. Finally, the distribution
of follower investment thresholds (Y ∗F ) does not exhibit a simple relationship to K. As imitation
cost increases, imitator entry occurs later if the innovator enters early (if min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
< YF ) and
earlier if the innovator enters late (if min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
> YF ). However, the gap (and therefore the
expected time lag) between leader and follower entry increases stochastically with imitation cost.
Thus, higher imitation costs, as may result from higher technical or regulatory entry barriers,
may be said to accelerate innovative investment and delay the onset of imitative investment once
innovation has occurred.
Lastly, the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 leads to a simple result regarding industry
performance. Because in the different regimes of attrition and preemption, competition between
firms to secure either second or first mover advantages results in the dissipation of any potential
rents, it is only when the level of the imitation cost is such that neither of these regimes occurs
(case (ii), K = K̂) that investment thresholds are set optimally from the standpoint of industry
profit. Thus, all else equal, it is in those industries in which imitation costs approach this level
so that firms do not have a strong incentive to seek positional advantages of either sort that
industry value is most likely to be maximized. Note also that there is a threshold K˜ < K̂ (see
Appendix 1) such that if K ≤ K˜ , the expected firm value M(YS) is independent of imitation
cost. There is also therefore a range of imitation cost levels,
[
K˜, K̂
]
, over which greater resource
costs are not detrimental but instead strictly beneficial the industry. By shielding an innovator
from excessively rapid imitation, the incentive of innovators to unduly delay product introduction
is thereby reduced, and more timely product introduction benefits imitators as well.
Proposition 2 Viewed as a function of imitation cost, expected industry value is initially con-
stant, single-peaked, and attains its maximum when neither attrition nor preemption occur (K =
K̂).
3.2 Optimal intellectual property protection
We take it that regulators can broadly influence the relative cost of imitation, at least upward,
through their choice of intellectual property protection levels. Given this unique instrument, the
imitation cost K can be viewed as a decision variable of the regulator in which case we find it
natural to consider a second-best welfare benchmark in which firms are free to select their entry
thresholds and product market output or prices.
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Before deriving the formal result, it is possible to discuss welfare intuitively in light of the
intermediate results described above. Roughly speaking, since individual entry decisions do not
account for the positive effect of entry on consumer surplus, one would expect that firms tend to
enter too late from a social standpoint. Since industry value is maximized when the imitation
cost is at the critical value K̂, a constrained social optimum would therefore involve setting a
higher imitation cost so as to induce some degree of preemption. But although this reasoning is
suggestive of the answer, a more detailed analysis is necessary in order to accurately depict the
effect of imitation cost on welfare.
To begin with, expected welfare can be broken down into three parts: expected industry
value, consumer surplus from innovator entry, and consumer surplus from imitator entry. The
first of these is maximized at the critical imitation cost K̂, whereas the the other two depend on
K through the innovator and imitator entry thresholds. A higher imitation cost unambiguously
accelerates innovator entry which in turn increases consumer surplus, so the second of these
components is increasing in K. The last component is more difficult to characterize, in particular
in an attrition regime, since an increase in K may either delay (through its effect on the optimal
threshold YF at which imitator entry occurs with positive probability) or hasten imitator entry
(if innovator entry occurs after YF so imitator entry follows immediately). So long then as the
consumer surplus from imitator entry is not too large, the effect of imitation cost on the first two
components of welfare dominates, and the social optimum involves some degree of preemption.
To formalize this reasoning, consumer surplus is taken to be scaled by the market size param-
eter Yt, as is the case for firm profits. Let CSM and CSD then denote the unit flow of consumer
surplus under monopoly and under duopoly respectively. The social discount rate is assumed be
identical to that of firms for simplicity. Under these conditions, for given innovator and imitator
thresholds social welfare at time t can be written as
W (K) =(
CSM + piM
r − α min {Yi, Yj} − I
)(
Yt
min {Yi, Yj}
)β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare from innovation
+
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y
∗
F −K
)(
Yt
Y ∗F
)β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare from imitation
(6)
so as to reflect the successive monopoly and duopoly phases of the industry. In (6), recall that the
equilibrium thresholds min {Yi, Yj} and Y ∗F are themselves functions of K, and that the time at
which these thresholds are reached is stochastic. In addition, in an attrition regime the equilibrium
investment thresholds {Yi, Yj} chosen by firms are themselves stochastic as well. In order to
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identify the trade-offs involved in setting an optimal level of the imitation cost, it is useful to
re-express the social welfare function (6) and take expectations over the equilibrium distribution
of entry thresholds so as to get
E
Y˜i,Y˜j
W (K) = E
Y˜i,Y˜j
2V (Y˜i, Y˜j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry value
+
CSM
r − α
(
min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
})−(β−1)
Y βt︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from innovation
+
(CSD − CSM )
r − α Y
∗−(β−1)
F Y
β
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from imitation
 .
(7)
The first summand in (7) is the industry value. It is independent of the distribution of
min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
and equal to 2 min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (Y ∗F ;K)}, which is single-peaked with respect to
K with a maximum at K̂ by Proposition 2. The second term is the consumer surplus that results
from innovative investment. The expected value of this term increases with K, since a higher
imitation cost shifts the distribution of innovator entry thresholds (which may be degenerate,
e.g. under preemption) leftward. The third term is the consumer surplus that results from the
imitator’s entry into the market. Since a greater imitation cost raises the standalone imitation
threshold YF , the follower’s entry can occur later when K increases, delaying the second wave
of surplus that accrues to consumers. In the attrition regime, there is therefore a single possibly
ambiguous effect of higher imitation cost on welfare, which involves this third term. So long as
the effect of imitator entry on consumer surplus is therefore not too large, the first two effects
dominate the last one, in which case social welfare is increasing until K̂. The precise argument
regarding the relationship between imitation cost and welfare is given in Section A.5, and we
summarize some of the main points below.
First, within the range of preemption regimes (K > K̂), the innovator and imitator entry
thresholds are respectively YP and YF , so it is sufficient and straightforward to identify the local
maximum of (6). For some parameter values, the optimum is a corner solution (K∗ = ∞),
signifying that the social optimum involves a single active firm. This corner solution arises if the
contribution of the second firm’s entry to welfare (which consists both of the direct welfare effect
of the imitator’s investment and its strategic effect on the timing of innovator entry) is relatively
small, as occurs for instance if there is collusion in the product market (if 2piD ≈ piM ).
Second, within the rage of attrition regimes, there is a local maximum of welfare as well.
To establish this, it is sufficient to show that social welfare is decreasing at the critical value
K̂. For simplicity, set CSM = 0 (e.g. assume that a monopoly innovator practices perfect price
discrimination) so that the middle term in the welfare expression (7) drops out. Also, note that the
expected industry value term 2V
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
reaches a maximum at K̂ also so ∂V
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
/∂K
∣∣∣
K̂
=
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0. The behavior of social welfare at this critical point is therefore determined by the remaining
term, the consumer surplus from imitation. In an attrition regime, near K̂ (for K ∈
(
K˜, K̂
)
),
this term has two parts, depending on whether the innovator invests before YS (in which case
imitator investment occurs at YF ) or after (in which case imitator investment occurs immediately
afterward). Accounting for the equilibrium distribution of Y ∗F therefore gives this term as
(CSD − CSM )
r − α Y
−(β−1)
F Y
β
t
(
Gmin (YS ;K) +
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1 dGmin(s;K)
)
(8)
where Gmin (•) is the distribution of innovator entry thresholds (see Section A.2), which depends
notably on K. However, it can be shown that Gmin
(
YS ; K̂
)
= 1 and ∂Gmin
(
YS ; K̂
)
/∂K = 0.
Around the critical value K̂ therefore, changes in K have a second-order effect on the distribution
of entry thresholds compared with YF . Thus, an envelope argument on the welfare expression (7)
establishes that ∂E
Y˜i,Y˜j
W
(
K̂
)
/∂K < 0.
Finally, either of the local maxima (under attrition or preemption) can be a global maximum,
depending on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting from innovation and from
imitation.
To summarize,
Proposition 3 The social optimum involves a limited level of second mover advantage (K∗ > K˜).
Provided that a monopoly innovator does not perfectly price discriminate (CSM > 0) and that the
consumer surplus generated by the imitator’s entry (CSD − CSM ) is not too large, the social
optimum involves preemption rather than attrition (K∗ > K̂). Moreover, the optimal imitation
cost can be so high as to preclude imitator entry (K∗ =∞).
4 Patenting intensity, reverse engineering, and licensing
The framework we have developed is readily extended to incorporate other aspects that are usually
linked with innovation and imitation. One is the option that an innovating firm has to raise the
entry barrier of the imitator, either by technological choices in product development that render
reverse engineering more costly, or by strengthening the patentability of its product. Another is
to incorporate the possibility of contracting, which typically takes the form of technology transfer
that reduces the follower’s imitation cost in a context similar to a licensing agreement, but can
also involve a “pay for delay” agreement or a takeover. Both of these features add an intermediate
stage to the investment game, once the innovator’s entry has occurred and before the imitator
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invests, and have as a common feature that, by raising the standalone value of the innovating
firm, they tend to favor first-mover advantage and the emergence of preemption regimes.
4.1 Endogenous entry barrier
As a protective measure for its new product, in a first extension of the framework, the innovating
firm may rely on a varying degree of either legal or technical protection in order to influence the
imitation cost of a subsequent entrant. In case of legal protection, the imitation cost level reflects
the breadth of patents, with wider patents implying higher costs for inventing around to develop
a non-infringing imitation. Moreover, firms may decide to pursue patent protection more or less
aggressively, as is the case for pharmaceutical firms as discussed in the introduction. In case of
technical protection, the imitation costs are imparted by reverse engineering, and increase with
the complexity of the copied product. For instance, an innovating firm can render its product
more difficult to disassemble, or even add misleading complexity.14
Such choices may be incorporated into the framework of this paper by introducing a decision
by the innovating firm at the time of its investment to expend an additional irrecuperable cost,
which we denote by ρ, that raises the imitating firm’s sunk cost by an amount f (ρ), where f is
taken to be an increasing and concave function with f(0) = 0 for simplicity. The cost ρ is deducted
from the innovator payoff L
(
Yi, Y
e
−i
)
defined in (1). The investment costs of the innovator and
imitator are then redefined as I := I0 + ρ and K := K0 + f (ρ), where I0 and K0 represent the
baseline values where no effort is exerted on raising rival cost. With respect to the sequence of
decisions, the choice of ρ arises once the roles of firms are determined, and before the entry of the
second firm. This corresponds to adding an intermediate stage to the game, so that we have:
• Stage 1’: both firms select initial entry thresholds (Yi, Yj) that determine innovator and
imitator roles;
• Stage 2’: if a single firm (i) innovates, it selects a degree of patenting effort and product
complexity (ρ);
• Stage 3’: the remaining firm (j) then selects its imitator entry threshold.
Proceeding by backward induction, with an endogenous entry barrier for imitation, the imi-
tator payoff is a nonincreasing function of K and therefore of the innovator’s effort, ρ, whereas its
14Samuelson and Scotchmer [32] provide an extensive review of the economic and legal aspects of reverse engi-
neering practices.
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entry threshold Y ∗F (ρ) = max {Yi, YF (ρ)} is nondecreasing in ρ. In stage 2’, the innovator now
faces a post-entry decision problem, maxρ (L (Yi, Y
∗
F (ρ))− ρ). Provided that Yi is not too large,
the optimum solution is interior, and the optimal cost-raising effort satisfies15
β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
Yi
YF (ρ∗)
)β
f ′ (ρ∗) = 1. (9)
The reasoning for stage 1’ proceeds as in Section 2, save that the innovation and imitation payoffs
now take the respective forms L (Yi, Y
∗
F (ρ
∗)) and F (Y ∗F (ρ
∗) ;K0 + f (ρ∗)), and the equilibrium is
as characterized in Proposition 1.
Figures 1−5 are useful to get insight into the effect of endogenous entry barriers. The optimal
choice of effort is positive over a range of investment thresholds, resulting in a lower follower payoff,
whereas the leader payoff is higher. We can therefore conclude that incorporating patenting and
technological choice into the analysis results in a more preemptive strategic investment game,
lowering the critical imitation cost threshold K̂0 that separates the two regimes. Moreover, when
the imitation cost is at this critical level, so that firms do not compete for positional rents, the
standalone innovator entry threshold is greater than YL since an innovator faces an additional
sunk cost ρ∗. Innovative firms generally find it optimal to exert some effort to increase the level
of entry barriers, except in the case where the innovator enters at a very high threshold in a
waiting game. When this effort is positive, it decreases with the baseline imitation cost, which it
supplements (∂ρ∗/∂K0 < 0). This latter result is in line with the biopharmaceutical industry case
discussed in Section 1.2: firms typically place greater reliance on patenting in the medications
segment, in which natural entry barriers are low, than in the vaccines segment.
Finally, some comparative statics results follow directly from the first-order condition (9).
For instance, it is straightforward to show that greater monopoly profits or a more productive
cost-raising technology, such as greater patent protection (higher f ′), are associated with a higher
endogenous entry barrier. Ambiguous effects can also arise, for instance with respect to volatility.
Greater volatility results in a higher entry barrier if the innovator invests at a relatively low
threshold (as is more likely to occur in the preemption regime where the follower’s option value is
important), and conversely in a lower entry barrier in industries with attrition and where follower
entry is often instantaneous, so ∂ρ∗/∂σ ≷ 0.
15If ρ is expenditure on patenting, the corner solution is of economic interest in that it reflects the choice of a
firm not to patent and rely on lead times instead. This outcome is more likely to arise if a fixed cost of patenting is
introduced, or if the innovator invests sufficiently late in an attrition regime so that follower investment is immediate,
and attaining an effective degree of patent protection (Y ∗F (ρ
∗) > Yi) is therefore prohibitively costly.
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4.2 Contractual alternatives
Having established the baseline investment incentives of innovators and imitators, it is possible
next to broaden the range of contracting possibilities offered to firms. An often-discussed alter-
native in the context of innovation and imitation is licensing. Suppose therefore that some of
the knowledge developed by the innovator can be transferred to the second firm. Other types of
contracts can also arise. If an imitator can commit not to enter the market over a certain period,
a innovator might consider a pay-for-delay agreement,16 if such are allowed, and an extreme case
of a pay-for-delay agreement is a takeover, in which case imitator entry never occurs. We do not
propose in this section to study the optimal form of contract in full generality, in particular in the
case of the licensing agreement. Rather, we make the simplifying assumption that firms have one
type of contractual alternative, which consists in making a lump-sum payment contingent upon
investment time or threshold, and which may incorporate a technology transfer.17 This simple
form of contract suffices to illustrate a diversity of outcomes. Also, we assume that the contract
is written by the innovator, who holds all the bargaining power.
The formal effect of introducing this contractual alternative is to add an intermediate stage
to the game, which has the form of a dynamic agency problem in which the innovator seeks to
guide the imitating firm’s investment behavior. Let K0 denote an incompressible level of imitation
cost, reflecting such items as distribution and marketing expenses, and KI denote that part of
the imitator’s product development cost that can be eliminated by a knowledge transfer from the
innovator, so the fixed cost of the imitator is K := K0 +KI . The sequence of events is:
• Stage 1”: both firms select initial entry thresholds (Yi, Yj) that determine innovator and
imitator roles;
• Stage 2”: if a single firm (i) innovates, it proposes a contract (license, pay for delay) involving
lump sum transfer fee (ϕ);
• Stage 3”: the remaining firm (j) decides whether or not to accept the contract and selects
its entry threshold.
16The emblematic practice of “pay for delay” contracts, as occurs between a pharmaceutical firm and a generic
manufacturer, is an application of our framework.
17If royalty payments associated with a licensing agreement are a flow, the imitator retains a valuable option
to invest in product development on its own later on. Other equilibria then arise which are analogous to those
described by Hori and Mizuno [21]’s model of access charges.
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The reservation value of the follower if it rejects any contract with the innovator is the value
which results from the equilibrium described in Section 2, F (Y ∗F ;K0 +KI). Because this reser-
vation value is not constant over time (until it is eventually realized at Stage 3”) it is use-
ful to denote it as F0 (Yt). Any contract must therefore satisfy the participation constraint
F (Y ∗F (ϕ);K0 + ϕ) ≥ F0 (Yt). The transfer ϕ is allowed to be time dependent, but we omit
the time subscript for simplicity. There are then two subcases to consider, which depend on the
optimal number of firms for the industry. The first corresponds to a standard industrial organiza-
tion framework, whereas the second allows for a sufficient degree of product complementarity, so
that duopoly profits exceed the monopoly level. This latter case is of interest in that it illustrates
a richer interaction between the two firms.
Case i. (2piD ≤ piM ) If profits are maximized when there is a single firm in the industry, an
innovator may seek to pay the imitator its reservation value in order to delay entry indefinitely
(a takeover), provided that entry barriers are sufficient to preclude any further entry. If product
market competition is severe enough and the innovator does not enter excessively late in an
attrition regime, the innovator indeed finds it optimal to buy out and shut down the imitator
in stage 2”. The expected payoff function of the leader in stage 1” is therefore shifted up,
accelerating innovation in a preemption regime and raising industry value in an attrition regime.
As this contracting option eliminates the imitator entry in the market, the resulting consequences
for economic welfare are ambiguous. Although it is generally preferable from a static welfare
standpoint to have competition in the product market, recall that as detailed Section 3 a monopoly
can be more dynamically efficient (when K∗ = ∞). In such cases, a takeover can raise total
welfare. As an example, suppose that the product market functions as a cartel (2piD = piM ) and
that the imitation cost is such that firms are in a preemption regime. Then, leaving the level of
industry profit unchanged, product introduction occurs earlier when the first firm can conduct a
takeover than under standard preemption resulting in a higher level of consumer surplus.
If a takeover is not feasible, the best option for the innovator is to allow follower entry at the
usual threshold Y ∗F , but set a maximum license fee ϕ
∗ = KI . As licensing reduces the innovator’s
irreversible cost of investment by the expected licensing revenue KI(Yi/Y
∗
F )
β, the leader payoff
is higher, the standalone innovator threshold is lower, and the absence of duplication of effort
reduces the industry’s resource cost.
Case ii. (2piD > piM ) If the second firm’s entry increases industry profit, as may occur if there
is product differentiation and sufficient product market complementarity, then there is a finite op-
timal imitator entry threshold for the industry, given by Y ∗∗F := β (r − α)K0/ (β − 1) (2piD − piM ).
This threshold is greater than the standalone imitator threshold if the amount of transfer-
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able technology is small or if product market complementarity is not too strong (formally, if
K0/ (K0 +KI) > 2− piM/piD), but can be smaller otherwise, in which case an innovator seeks to
accelerate imitator entry. In all cases, the innovator induces the industry optimum by setting a
license fee policy that consists of a forcing contract, i.e.
ϕ∗ =
piD
r − αY
∗∗
F −K0 − F0 (Y ∗∗F ) (10)
if the follower invests at Y−i = Y ∗∗F and no license otherwise.
Although this description of contractual alternatives is clearly simplified, it is sufficient to
shed further light on innovation incentives. In comparison with the baseline model, the expected
value of the imitator in the first stage of the game is unchanged. Therefore, the main effect
of introducing a supplemental instrument is generally to raise leader profit, thereby accelerating
innovative investment in preemptive regimes, and raising industry profit in attrition regimes. The
consequences for imitative investment can be quite different, and range from accelerated imitation,
to no imitation at all.
4.3 Synthesis
As shown in this section, allowing a richer set of interactions between innovating and imitating
firms heightens potential first-mover advantages, raising the likelihood that strategic investment
dynamics take the form of a preemption race. Where technological choices and contractual al-
ternatives can have contrasting effects is with respect to the timing of imitator entry, which is
naturally delayed when entry barriers are endogenous, but which may be accelerated or eliminated
by contractual measures, so that the latter may be thought of as inducing a greater variance in
imitation outcomes. Naturally, real-world firms may also concurrently face the different decisions
described in this section, and a structured examination of the trade-offs that may then arise
requires additional assumptions and is left for further work.
Proposition 4 In an extended framework for strategic investment:
(i) a firm that innovates early enough increases its expected value by raising the imitating firm’s
entry cost, resulting in a more preemptive investment regime with delayed imitation, whereas
(ii) if an innovating firm can contract with the imitating firm, the optimal contract involves either
a takeover (which can be welfare-increasing) or a licensing agreement. These contracts result in
a more preemptive investment regime and earlier innovation, whereas imitation may be either
accelerated or delayed.
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5 Conclusion
We have sought to develop an integrative framework so as to study some long-standing questions
regarding the allocation of resources to innovation and to imitation under imperfect competition,
in line with both established research on innovation and more recent theory on strategic invest-
ment. In the classic work in this field, intellectual property protection, and notably patent policy,
is motivated with reference to a trade-off between static and dynamic inefficiencies, as described
by Arrow [1] in a setting with monopoly and competition. The analysis of this trade-off under
imperfect competition and in a dynamic setting highlights an altogether different channel through
which changes in the cost of imitation influence firm choices, by altering the nature of strategic
competition (attrition vs. preemption). The broad message that emerges from the study of the
duopoly case remains consistent with this seminal work – notably, that some degree of protection
should be afforded to innovators when the cost of imitation is relatively small. At the same time,
alternative mechanisms such as technological choice and contracting alternatives exist that can,
to an extent, substitute for the regulatory protection of innovators so that a natural dynamic
allocation need not be less efficient than a regulated one.
Among the extensions of the framework that we have identified but have not pursued here,
a possible next step in the analysis is to study incremental innovation (or “versioning”) among
existing firms in a market. In this setting, it is more likely that simultaneous investment equilib-
rium solutions arise, suggesting that firms might coordinate on investment timing. It is not much
further to go to examine the possibility of cooperation in product development with these tools
as well.
A Proofs
A.1 Tie-breaking rule
The market entry game described in Section 2.2 is a reduced form of a timing game in which
firms choose (stochastic) investment times rather than thresholds. A complete specification of
the stochastic payoff case can be found in Thijssen et al. [36], of which we only give the most
summary description here.18
18Note that these authors focus their analysis on the preemption case, but the specification of the timing game
also applies to attrition.
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In the general timing game, firms choose so-called simple strategies that consist at any moment
t0 of of a pair of functions
(
Gt0i , α
t0
i
)
, the first of which is the cumulative distribution function of
a firm’s future investment times over the sample space, and the second of which is an investment
intensity or “atom function” that allows for coordination between firms at times when simulta-
neous investment by both firms is not optimal that satisfies a number of consistency conditions,
with αt0i (·) ∈ [0, 1]. With simple strategies, at any time t at which both firms simultaneously
attempt to invest, dropping time subscripts and the argument K for simplicity, firm i’s probability
of investing before its rival is
p (i) =
αi (1− αj)
αi + αj − αiαj (11)
and its expected payoff is
V˜i(αi, αj) = p (i)L(Y ;Y
∗
F ) + p (j)F (Y
∗
F ;K) + (1− p(i)− p(j))M(Y ). (12)
In a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies and positive investment intensity ((αi, αj) 6=
(0, 0)), αj should be such that firm i is indifferent between different intensities, i.e. ∂V˜i/∂αi = 0
where
∂V˜i
∂αi
= αj
−αj (L(Y ;Y ∗F )−M(Y )) + (L(Y ;Y ∗F )− F (Y ∗F ;K))
(αi + αj − αiαj)2
. (13)
The sign of (13) depends on the comparison of L(Y ;Y ∗F ) with M(Y ) and F (Y
∗
F ;K). For all
Y < (=)Y ∗F , we have L(Yt;Y
∗
F ) > (=)M(Yt;Y
∗
F ). Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies with positive investment intensity exists only if K > K̂ so that L(YL;Y
∗
F ) > F (Y
∗
F ;K).
Its support is then {Y ≤ YF |L(Y ;Y ∗F ) > F (Y ∗F ;K)}, with
α∗i = α
∗
j =
L(Y ;Y ∗F )− F (Y ∗F ;K)
L(Y ;Y ∗F )−M(Y )
(14)
which, given the investment probabilities (11) yields the tie-beaking rule (the investment proba-
bilities) and the reduced form payoff V (Yi, Yj) in (4).
A noteworthy feature of our model is that the behavior of the investment probabilities differs
qualitatively from the case studied by Thijssen et al. [36].19 To begin with, α∗i is not monotone
in Y over its support. Moreover, for K ∈
(
K̂, I
)
, the condition L(Y ;Y ∗F ) = F (Y
∗
F ;K) has two
distinct roots YP < YP ′ (see Figure 4). This means that, for some intermediate values of K, the
preemption range is a strict subset of [YP , YF ] so that, even though firms are in a preemption
regime, off the equilibrium path (or, if the game were to begin at a large enough level Y0), the
19In another extension of the standard real option game model, Billette de Villemeur et al. [4] provide a case
where the simultaneous investment probability reaches 1 in the interior of (YP , YF ).
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probability of simultaneous investment converges to zero and firms then face a subgame that is a
war of attrition. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section we first identify and characterize the threshold K̂. We then characterize the
innovator value function L (Yi, Y
∗
F ). Finally, we describe the equilibrium strategies in the attrition
(K < K̂) and preemption regimes (K ≥ K̂).
Characterization of K̂
We first verify that K̂ is well defined. Recalling that Y ∗F := arg maxF (Yi;K), if K = 0 we
have Y ∗F = Yi, and the follower investment in stage 2 of the game occurs immediately after the
leader has invested. In that case, from (1) and (2) we have
L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) =
(
piD
r − αYi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
<
piD
r − αYi
(
Yt
Yi
)β
= F (Y ∗F ; 0) , (15)
for all Yi ≥ Yt. Next, as K increases, L (Yi, Y ∗F ) shifts upwards since Y ∗F is nondecreasing in K
and ∂L (Yi, Yj) /∂Yj ≥ 0, all Yi, Yj . Also, F (Y ∗F ;K) shifts downward since Y ∗F is a maximizer of
F (Yi;K) and ∂F (Yi;K) /∂K < 0, all Yi. The maximum values at YL and YF necessarily satisfy
∂L (YL, Y
∗
F ) /∂K ≥ 0 and ∂F (Y ∗F ;K) /∂K < 0, with limK→∞ F (Y ∗F ;K) = 0. Therefore, there
exists a unique level of the imitation cost K̂ such that L (YL, Y
∗
F ) = F
(
Y ∗F ; K̂
)
.
Next, the threshold K̂ is given by the solution in K to L (YL, YF ) = F (YF ;K) (necessarily
YL ≤ YF ) which after simplification gives
K̂ =
(
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
(piM/piD)
β
)1/(β−1)
I, (16)
and it is direct to check that K̂ < (=)I for piD < (=)piM .
Characterization of L (Yi, Y
∗
F )
We characterize the maximum of the function L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) over [Yt,∞). There can be two local
maxima, at YL = arg maxL (Yi, YF ) and YS = arg max M (Yi), with YL ≤ YS . Let K˜ denote the
imitation cost such that L (YL, Y
∗
F ) = M (YS) which, for Y
∗
F = YF yields
K˜ =
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1)
(piM/piD)
β − 1
)1/(β−1)
I. (17)
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Then, YL (YS) is a unique global maximum of L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) if K > K˜ (K < K˜).
Let Kl := (piD/piM ) I denotes the imitation cost for which that YL = YF . Then, it is useful
to note the following ranking of the imitation costs in (16) and (17):
Kl ≤ K˜ ≤ K̂. (18)
(the inequalities in (18) are strict if piM > piD). Indeed, straightforward calculations show that
K˜ ≥ Kl if and only if
(β − 1) (piM/piD)β − β (piM/piD)β−1 + 1 ≥ 0, (19)
and that K̂ ≥ K˜ if and only if
(piM/piD)
β − β ((piM/piD)− 1)− 1 ≥ 0. (20)
Both of these conditions hold for all β, piM/piD ≥ 1.
Attrition equilibrium
For K < K̂ we have L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) < F (Y
∗
F ;K), all Yi, so firms play a waiting game. Note that
in this case there is no “mistaken” simultaneous investment and the simultaneous move payoff is
M (Yi). There are two subcases to consider, K < K˜(≤ K̂) and K˜ ≤ K < K̂.
attrition subcase a.
If K < K˜, we know from the characterization of L above that L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) has a unique global
maximum at YS and decreases over (YS ,∞). Any play in [YL, YS) is dominated by investing at
YS (see Figure 1). Firms therefore play a standard war of attrition with complete information
over [YS ,∞). By Theorem 3 of Hendricks et al. [18] and a continuity argument at YS (since
(∂L/∂Yi) (YS , Y
∗
F ) = 0), there is a unique nondegenerate symmetric equilibrium in which firms
randomize their entry triggers over [YS ,∞) according to the cumulative distribution
Ga (Yi;K) = 1− exp
∫ Yi
YS
M ′(s)
F (s;K)−M(s)ds (21)
that results in an expected payoff of M (YS). Substituting for the functions F and M and
integrating gives the expression
Ga (Yi;K) = 1−
(
Yi
YS
) βI
I−K
exp−
{
βI
I −K
(
Yi
YS
− 1
)}
. (22)
Note that as YF ≤ YS , follower entry always occurs immediately after the first investment.
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attrition subcase b.
If K˜ ≤ K < K̂, we know from the characterization of L above that L (Yi, Y ∗F ) has a global
maximum at YL and a local maximum at YS . Because the leader payoff L (Yi, Y
∗
F ) is not monotonic
over [YL, YS ], the attrition game is nonstandard. Let YS′ denote the unique solution in [YL, YF ] to
the condition L (YS′ , YF ) = M (YS). To verify that this threshold is well-defined, note that YL ≤
YF ≤ YS sinceKl ≤ K˜ ≤ K and K̂ ≤ I, and that L (Yi, Y ∗F ) is continuous and monotone decreasing
on [YL, YF ] (see Figure 2). To derive the equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction.
First, the subgame starting at YS is a standard war of attrition, so conditionally on YS being
reached, firms randomize their entry times according to the distribution Ga given in (21) above.
Next, any play in (YS′ , YS) is weakly dominated by investing at YS . The expected payoff in
the subgame starting at YS′ is therefore M (YS) .
Lastly, consider a truncation of the game at YS′ so that firms are constrained to effectively in-
vest over the interval of thresholds [YL, YS′ ] with a terminal payoff M (YS). This is a standard war
of attrition with complete information and by Hendricks et al. [18] there is a unique nondegenerate
symmetric equilibrium in which firms randomize their entry triggers over [YL, YS′ ] with a possible
terminal mass point q := Pr {Yi = YS′}. Because expected payoffs are constant over the support
of mixed strategies, q satisfies the condition that qM (YS) + (1− q)F (Y ∗F ;K) = L (YL, Y ∗F ). The
equilibrium of the truncated game therefore has firms randomizing their entry thresholds over
[YL, YS′) according to the cumulative distribution
G0 (Yi;K) = 1− exp
∫ Yi
YL
∂L(s, Y ∗F )/∂Yi
F
(
Y ∗F ;K
)− L(s, Y ∗F ) (23)
with an atom q (YS′) = (F (Y
∗
F ;K)− L (YL, Y ∗F )) / (F (Y ∗F ;K)−M (YS)). Evaluating the integral
in (23) yields the expression
G0 (Yi;K) =
L (YL, YF )− L (Yi, YF )
F (YF ;K)− L (Yi, YF ) (24)
and in particular,
G0 (YS′ ;K) =
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
)
I1−β − β ((piM/piD)− 1)K1−β
K1−β − I1−β . (25)
With these elements, the symmetric equilibrium of the full attrition game over [YL,∞) can be
described. Note first that if a firm plays an atom at YS′ , the other firm strictly prefers delaying
entry until YS . In a symmetric equilibrium first entry thresholds are therefore continuously
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distributed over the disconnected support [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞). On this support, the cumulative
distribution function
Gb (Yi;K) =

G0 (Yi;K) if YL ≤ Yi ≤ YS′
G0 (YS′ ;K) if YS′ < Yi < YS
G0 (YS′ ;K) + (1−G0 (YS′ ;K))Ga (Yi;K) if YS ≤ Yi
(26)
is the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and results in an expected payoff L (YL, Y
∗
F ).
For Yi < YF , follower entry occurs later than the first entry, and immediately after otherwise.
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Preemption equilibrium
For K > (=)K̂ we have L (YL, Y
∗
F ) > (=)F (Y
∗
F ;K) and so there exists a unique YP ∈ (Yt, YL]
such that L (YP , Y
∗
F ) = F (Y
∗
F ;K). We refer to “preemption” when the inequality is strict so that
YP < YL. Both firms seek to invest at YP , with equal probability of being an innovator or of
effectively entering as an imitator at YF . The structure of the game is very similar to a standard
preemption game and the arguments establishing equilibrium are similar, although two additional
points need to be made.
If K < I, the equilibrium condition L (·, Y ∗F ) = F (Y ∗F ;K) has another root YP ′ ∈ (YL, YF )
(see Section A.1). In this case, and in contrast with standard preemption games, in a subgame
where Yt > YP ′ and that is never reached on the equilibrium path, firms play a war of attrition
resulting in an expected payoff L (Yt, Y
∗
F ). As L (Yt − ε, Y ∗F ) > L (Yt, Y ∗F ), a firm prefers to enter
earlier rather than to reach this subgame.
Second, although simultaneous investment is generally not an equilibrium in the standard new
market model of strategic investment, the suboptimality of simultaneous investment needs to be
verified here because of the difference between leader and follower investment costs. Investment
at the optimal simultaneous investment threshold YS results in a payoff M (YS) and evaluating,
L (YL, Y
∗
F )
M (YS)
=
(
piM
piD
)β
− β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
I
K
)β−1
. (27)
This ratio is increasing in K and therefore over the preemption range for which simultaneous
equilibrium might arise, it is minimized at K̂. Substituting K̂ for K and simplifying gives
L (YL, Y
∗
F ) /M (YS) =
(
I/K̂
)(β−1) ≥ 1, with strict inequality if piM > piD. The best response
to Y−i = YS is YL if K = K̂. Therefore firms seek to preempt one another before the simultane-
ous investment threshold is reached, for all K ≥ K̂. 
20Note that the equilibrium solution satisfies certain continuity properties in K. For K = K˜, YL = YS′ and
q (YS′) = 1 in the truncated game, yielding G0 (YS′) = 0, whereas for K = K̂, G0
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1.
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
To establish the corollary we characterize the effect of β and piM/piD on K̂(piM/piD, β), defined in
(16) above. Provided that piD < piM , we have ∂K̂/∂ (piD/piM ) < 0, and ∂K̂/∂β < 0: evaluating
the partial derivatives and rearranging yields
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
= −β ((piM/piD)− 1) (1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1))
2−β
β−1 (piM/piD)
1−2β
β−1 I (28)
and
∂K̂
∂β
=
−1
(β − 1)2
[
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
− (β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
]
K̂. (29)
The sign ∂K̂/∂ (piM/piD) < 0 follows directly from (28). Together with K̂(1, β) = I and
limpiM/piD→∞ K̂(piM/piD, β) = 0, we thus also obtain that 0 ≤ K̂ ≤ I. The sign ∂K̂/∂β < 0
is determined by the middle (bracketed) term in (29). More specifically, since lnx > (x− 1) /x
for x > 0 and x 6= 1, we have ln[(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)] > (β − 1) [(piM/piD)− 1]/[1 +
β ((piM/piD)− 1)], which together with K̂(piM/piD, β) > 0 is sufficient to conclude. 
A.4 Section 3.1 arguments and industry optimum (Proposition 2)
Sensitivity analysis of investment thresholds
Consider first the innovator threshold Y˜I . If K < K˜ (or K = K˜), the hazard rate of the
distribution of first entry thresholds implied by (23) is
ha (Yi;K) =
βI
I −K
(
1
Yi
− 1
YS
)
, (30)
so ∂h/∂K ≥ 0. For K˜ < K < K̂, the hazard rate corresponding to (26) is defined by parts. Over
[YL, YS′) the hazard rate is
h0 (Yi;K) =
−∂L(Yi, Y ∗F )/∂Yi
F
(
Y ∗F ;K
)− L(Yi, Y ∗F ) (31)
which has a numerator that is independent ofK, so ∂h0/∂K = − (∂ (F − L) /∂K) (∂L/∂Yi) / (F − L)2 ≥
0. Similarly over [YS′ ,∞) we have ∂h/∂K ≥ 0. Note that the hazard rate is discontinuous at YS′
and YS , but as ∂YS′/∂K ≥ 0 and ∂YS/∂K = 0, it increases over the entire range [YS ,∞). Finally,
for K > K̂, YP decreases with K. Therefore the first entry threshold of each firm decreases with
K (stochastically in the attrition regime and deterministically in the preemption regime), as does
the minimum of the two, which is the threshold for both firms.
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With respect to imitator investment, the second entry threshold Y ∗F is a random variable.
In the attrition regime, it decreases in a stochastic sense over (YF ,∞), that is when follower
entry is immediate, but increases otherwise. However, the difference between the first and second
entry thresholds is simple to characterize. For Kl ≤ K < K̂, Y ∗F − Y˜I = max
{
0, YF − Y˜I
}
is
distributed over [0, YF − YL] as 1 − G• (YF − s). So the difference between the second and the
first entry threshold increases with K (stochastically in the attrition range and deterministically
in the preemption range).
Industry optimum
The proposition follows directly from the equilibrium value resulting from rent equalization,
E
Y˜i,Y˜j
V
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
= min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)} and the sensitivity of L and F to K. Note that
for K ≤ K˜, min {L (Y ∗L , Y ∗F ) , F (YF ;K)} = M(YS) which is independent of K and that at K =
K̂, M(YS) < L (YL, Y
∗
F ) = F
(
YF ; K̂
)
. Therefore, E
Y˜i,Y˜j
V
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
is constant over
[
0, K˜
)
,
increasing over
(
K˜, K̂
)
, and decreasing over
(
K̂,∞
)
. 
A.5 Imitation cost and consumer surplus (Proposition 3)
The argument is divided into four parts. We first determine the optimal imitation cost level,
KP , in the closure of the preemption regime (K ≥ K̂). Second, we establish a lower bound for
the optimal imitation cost (K∗ ≥ K˜). Third, we establish the existence of a local optimum of
welfare under attrition (K˜ ≤ K < K̂). Finally, we conclude by comparing the optimum under
preemption with the optimal welfare that is attained in the attrition regime.
Socially optimal imitation cost in preemption regime
Suppose that K ≥ K̂, so entry thresholds are YP and YF . The social welfare function (7) then
has the form
W (K) =
(
piM + CSM
r − α YP − I
)(
Yt
YP
)β
+
(
(2piD + CSD)− (piM + CSM )
r − α YF −K
)(
Yt
YF
)β
.
(32)
Noting that YP and YF are functions of K, with YP ∈ [YNPV, YL] differentiable and strictly decreas-
ing (where YNPV = (r − α) I/piM is the Marshallian investment threshold for a monopoly firm).
Using the preemption equilibrium condition L (YP , YF ) = F (YF ;K) which implicitly defines the
ratio (YF /YP )
β, the derivative of (32) can be expressed as
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dW
dK
=
(
Yt
YF
)β(βpiM
piD
− (β − 1)
) (1 + CSMpiM )YP − YL
YL − YP − β
(2piD + CSD)− (piM + CSM )
piD
+ (β − 1)
 .
(33)
If CSM = 0 (perfect price discrimination under monopoly), the YL − YP terms in (33) cancel out
and it is straightforward to verify that dW/dK < 0, so that K̂ is a maximum. For CSM > 0, (33)
satisfies lim
K̂
dW/dK = +∞ and is strictly decreasing in K. Then if lim∞ dW/dK < 0, there is
a unique root KP > K̂ that constitutes an interior optimum, which occurs if(
β2
piM
piD
− (β − 1)2
)
CSM
piM
− βCSD
piD
− 2 > 0. (34)
For notational simplicity, in what follows we allow KP =∞.
Lower bound on socially optimal imitation cost
If K < K˜ (attrition subcase a. in Section A.2 above) so firms randomize investment trig-
gers over [YS ,∞) according to the distribution Ga (Yi;K) and imitator entry is immediate, then
W (K) < W
(
K̂
)
. To see this, note first that by Proposition 2, industry value is lower atK than at
K̂, so it suffices to show that expected consumer surplus is lower also. But at K̂, innovator and imi-
tator entry occur at the standalone thresholds YL and YF =
(
β (r − α) K̂
)
/ ((β − 1)piD), whereas
the lower bound of the entry threshold distribution under attrition is YS = (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD) ≥
YF with Ga (YS ;K) < 1. Therefore, both investments occur later if K < K˜ than they do at the
critical imitation cost K̂, resulting in lower consumer surplus and welfare.
Existence of local maximum in attrition regime
Consider the value of E
Y˜i,Y˜j
W
(
K̂
)
as K approaches K̂ from below. Since V
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
is
maximized at K̂, at this critical value the sign of dE
Y˜i,Y˜j
W
(
K̂
)
/dK depends only on the behavior
of the consumer surplus term. For simplicity, consider the third term, consumer surplus from
imitation (the argument for the other term is similar). As noted in the text, the consumer surplus
from imitation is given by
CSD − CSM
r − α Y
−(β−1)
F Y
β
t
 Gmin (YS′ ;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lagged imitator entry
+
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1 dGmin(s;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸

immediate imitator entry
. (35)
To determine the value of the derivative of this expression with respect to K at K̂, recall that
the distribution of entry thresholds is given by Gmin (Yi;K) = 1 − (1−G• (Yi;K))2. Consider
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the first summand in (35). Since G0
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1, Gmin
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1. Moreover ∂Gmin/∂K =
2 (1−G•) ∂G•/∂K so ∂Gmin
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
/∂K = 0. Therefore, in (35) only the direct effect of K on
YF matters for welfare at K̂. A similar argument applies to the consumer surplus from innovation
term in (7), with no direct effect since YL is independent of K.
Therefore,
lim
K̂−
dE
Y˜i,Y˜j
W
(
K̂
)
dK
= − (β − 1) CSD − CSM
r − α Y
−β
F Y
β
t
∂YF
∂K
≤ 0. (36)
Since W (K) is continuous, we conclude that if CSD > CSM , there exists a (local) optimum
imitation cost level KA in the attrition range that satisfies K˜ < KA < K̂.
Global welfare optimum
From above, we therefore know that lim
K̂− dW (K) /dK < 0 and that, for CSM > 0,
lim
K̂+
dW (K) /dK > 0 so that welfare has local maxima in both the attrition (specifically, for
K ∈
(
K˜, K̂
)
) and preemption ranges (whereas the local maximum under preemption is KP = K̂
if CSM = 0). Either type of local maximum can be a global maximum, depending on the relative
magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting from innovation or from imitation. Since W (K) is
continuous in the model’s parameters, we can consider successively the cases where one of these
surpluses becomes arbitrarily small to show this.
First, if CSM = 0, KP = K̂, and since limK̂− dW (K) /dK < 0, social welfare is maximized
for a value of K that lies in the attrition range.
Alternatively, suppose that CSM > 0 (so KP > K̂) and take CSD − CSM = 0. Then, for
K ≤ K̂, W (K) ≤ W
(
K̂
)
< W (KP ) where the first inequality results from Proposition 2
and because innovator entry thresholds satisfy Y˜i ≥ YL. Therefore, the local optimum in the
preemption range KP is a global welfare maximum in this case. 
A.6 Endogenous entry barrier
In stage 3’, the imitator payoff depends on the cost-raising effort ρ:
F (Yi;K) =
(
piD
r − αYi −K0 − f (ρ)
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
. (37)
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The optimal standalone imitator threshold is YF (ρ) = (β (r − α) (K0 + f (ρ))) / ((β − 1)piD),
yielding an optimal choice Y ∗F (ρ) = max {Yi, YF }. In stage 2’, an innovator having entered at the
threshold Yi chooses a level of effort that maximizes
L (ρ) =
(
piM
r − αYi − I0 − ρ
)
+
piD − piM
r − α Y
∗
F (ρ)
(
Yi
Y ∗F (ρ)
)β
. (38)
If Yi ≤ YF (0), the solution is the interior solution ρ∗ given by (9), whereas if Yi is arbitrar-
ily large, L (ρ∗) < L(0), so both types of solutions arise. Note that in contrast with the
payoff functions shown in Figures 1 − 3, since the optimal effort ρ∗ depends on the innova-
tor’s entry threshold Yi, with ∂ρ
∗/∂Yi ≥ 0, the follower payoff in the first stage of the game,
F (Y ∗F (ρ
∗) ;K0 + ρ∗)(≤ F (Y ∗F (0);K0)) is decreasing rather than constant. In stage 1’ therefore,
the payoff V (Yi, Yj) given by (4) is defined for the underlying innovator and imitator payoffs
L (Yi, Y
∗
F (ρ
∗)) and F (Y ∗F (ρ
∗) ;K0 + f (ρ∗)). At the critical imitation cost K̂0 that separates the
attrition and preemption regimes and because F (Y ∗F (ρ
∗) ;K0 + ρ∗) is decreasing in Yi, at the
standalone optimum YL, L (YL, Y
∗
F (ρ
∗)) > F
(
Y ∗F (ρ
∗) ; K̂0 + f (ρ∗)
)
so the equilibrium condi-
tion is satisfied above YL, and innovator entry occurs “too late” from the standpoint of industry
value. Finally, since L (ρ∗) ≥ L(0), the same arguments apply as with Proposition 1 to rule out
a simultaneous investment equilibrium in the preemption regime.
With regard to the signs of the comparative statics mentioned in the text, since f is concave,
it is sufficient to determine those of ∂2L/∂ρ∂piM and ∂
2L/∂ρ∂σ. The sign of the former is
immediate, and for the second,
∂2L (Yi;YF (ρ
∗)) /∂ρ∂σ = β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
2β − 1
β − 1 + β ln
(
Yi
YF (ρ∗)
))(
Yi
YF (ρ∗)
)β
f ′ (ρ∗)
∂β
∂σ
.
(39)
The sign of the second bracketed term depends in the investment threshold of the innovator. It
is negative if Yi < e
−β(2β−1)/(β−1)YF (ρ∗) and zero or positive otherwise. 
A.7 Contractual alternatives
Note that an alternative interpretation, viewing the rights to profit streams as real assets, runs
as follows. After the initial investment, the imitator holds a natural call option on duopoly profit
flow piD at a strike price of K. Until that option is exercised, the innovator perceives a flow of
differential monopoly rent piM −piD, but it can alternatively sell what constitutes a call option on
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the duopoly profit flow to the imitator, at a strike price ϕ, and with a transaction cost K0 that
is paid by the imitator. When piM < 2piD, this is an efficient trade.
Formally, in a typical licensing setup, the innovator’s decision in stage 2” takes the form:
max
ϕ
Vlic. (ϕ) =
(
ϕ− piM − piD
r − α Y
∗
F (ϕ)
)(
Yt
Y ∗F (ϕ)
)β
(40)
where Y ∗F (ϕ) is the follower’s investment threshold depends on ϕt, and the time subscript is
dropped for simplicity. We consider the cases discussed in the text successively.
case i . (2piD ≤ piM )
For simplicity, we assume that the firm’s environment is such that the different decision
problems (takeover, technology licensing) are exclusive, so that they can be treated separately.
First, suppose that 2piD < piM and a takeover is feasible. The innovator’s payoff in this case is
Ltak. (Yi) =
(
piM
r − αYi − I − ϕ
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
(41)
and the optimal transfer (to the imitator) is ϕ = F0(Yt). As imitator entry reduces industry flow
profit, a takeover is always efficient for the firms and is straightforward to verify that Ltak. (Yi) >
L (Yi, Y
∗
F ). The leader’s stage 1” payoff is thus maxLtak. (Yi). Note that the optimal standalone
threshold YL is higher when takeovers are allowed, so the distribution of innovator entry thresholds
is shifted right in an attrition regime. The case of a license fee as described in the text is direct.
To establish that a takeover increases welfare, consider the case where there is a cartel on the
product market, 2piD = piM , so imitator entry leaves consumer surplus unchanged. If K > K̂,
preemption occurs and industry value is set at F0(Yt) by rent equalization regardless of whether
takeovers are allowed or not. A takeover is efficient in this case if the first firm enters earlier when
it can make a takeover offer to its rival, i.e. if the lower root of Ltak. (Yi) = F (YF ;K) is lower
than YP , which holds since Ltak. (Yi) > L (Yi, Y
∗
F ).
case ii . (2piD > piM )
In stage 2”, the innovator chooses ϕ∗ so as to optimize the payoff (40). For Yi ≤ min {YF , Y ∗∗F },
the stage 1” leader payoff is correspondingly
Llic. (Yi, Y
∗∗
F ) =
(
piM
r − αYi − I
)(
Yt
Yi
)β
+
(
ϕ− piM − piD
r − α Y
∗∗
F
)(
Yt
Y ∗∗F
)β
(42)
and the reasoning proceeds similarly to above. 
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YL
F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF ) M(Yi)
YF YS
E(Vi)
F (YF ;K)
Figure 1: Attrition regime, K ∈
[
0, K˜
)
. YS is a global maximum of the leader payoff, innovator
entry thresholds are distributed over [YS ,∞), and imitator entry occurs immediately after. Note
that if K < Kl, then YF < YL.
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YL
F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF )
M(Yi)
YFYS′ YS
F (YF ;K)
E(Vi)
Figure 2: Attrition regime, K ∈
[
K˜, K̂
)
. The leader payoff has two local maxima (YL, YS),
innovator entry thresholds are distributed over [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞), and imitator entry occurs
either at YF (if min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
∈ [YL, YS′ ]) or immediately otherwise (if min
{
Y˜i, Y˜j
}
∈ [YS ,∞)).
YL
E(Vi)
F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF )
L(Yi, Yi)
YF
Figure 3: Critical case, K = K̂. The innovator and imitator enter at YL and YF respectively.
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YL
E(Vi) F (Yi;K)
L(Yi, YF )
L(Yi, Yi)
YFYP YP ′
Figure 4: Preemption regime, K ∈
(
K̂, I
)
. The innovator enters at YP and the imitator at YF .
There is war of attrition off the equilibrium path (over (YP ′ ,∞)).
YL
E(Vi)
F (Yi;K)
L(YL, YF )
L(Yi, YF )
YFYP
Figure 5: Preemption regime, K ∈ [I,∞). The innovator enters at YP and the imitator at YF .
Note that the dotted curve represents F (Yi;K) whreas the corresponding solid curve is the
concentrated follower payoff F (Y ∗F ;K).
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